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ARTICLES
THE COMMON LAW IS NOT JUST ABOUT CONTRACTS:
HOW LEGAL EDUCATION HAS BEEN SHORT-
CHANGING FEMINISM
Charles E. Rounds, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
The contract is not the only private legal relationship woven in-
to the fabric of our common law. There are also the agency and
trust, two robust and powerful core fiduciary relationships, the
former being enforceable in equity and the latter being an inven-
tion of equity. Reading Professor Martha M. Ertman's Legal Ten-
derness: Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law, I came away
* Copyright Charles E. Rounds, Jr., 2009. Charles E. Rounds, Jr. is a tenured pro-
fessor of law at Suffolk University Law School in Boston and the author of fifteen editions
of Loring: A Trustee's Handbook, which has been cited in numerous judicial decisions and
articles, as well as cited and excerpted multiple times in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.
CCH has also incorporated the handbook into several of its electronic products. He has
twice testified before Congress on trust-related matters. In July 2007, the New York Uni-
versity Journal of Law and Business published Publicly-Traded Open End Mutual Funds
in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions: A Comparison of Legal Structures. The
journal article was co-authored by Professor Rounds and Andreas Dehio of Heidelberg
University in Germany. In 2008, the Baylor Law Review published Lawyer Codes Are Just
About Licensure, the Lawyer's Relationship with the State: Recalling the Common Law
Agency, Contract, Tort, Trust, and Property Principles that Regulate the Lawyer-Client Re-
lationship. Professor Rounds was the sole author of that article. For over thirty years, Pro-
fessor Rounds, an Academic Fellow of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel;
Resident Fellow of the Beacon Hill Institute, and Chairman of the Board of The Tuerck
Foundation for the Study of Economics, Law, and the Humanities, has been writing about,
as well as lecturing and consulting on, fiduciary issues, particularly social investing, social
security partial privatization, the legal structuring of mutual funds, and the marginaliza-
tion of the fiduciary relationship in the American law school curriculum. On numerous
occasions he has served as a litigation consultant expert witness. Professor Rounds's full
biography, including a link to the mutual fund and lawyer code law review articles, may
be obtained by visiting his faculty web page at http://www.law.suffolk.edu/faculty/direct
ories/faculty.cfm?lnstructorlD=49.
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with the sense that the property branch of mainstream feminist
scholarship is based on a false premise, namely that there are re-
ally only two general ways of empowering and protecting women
economically: either by private contract or state regulation, or by
some accommodation between the two.' Many trees have been sa-
crificed and much ink spilled over the extent to which our free-
dom to contract should be constrained by state regulation in order
to accommodate perceived or actual gender-based vulnerabilities.2
Even Professor Clare Dalton's ambitious An Essay in the De-
construction of Contract Doctrine embarks from this false pre-
mise.' In the entire essay, Dalton mentions the fiduciary principle
only once, an oblique reference in the essay's 244th footnote.4
For whatever reason, the vast body of empowering and protec-
tive doctrine governing transactions between parties in fiduciary
or confidential relationships has been reduced to a tiny blip on
the feminist scholar's radar screen. One learned commentator has
suggested that "[a]mong many feminists there is a suspicion, even
a fear, that autonomy and choice through contract and the mar-
ket are traps that will only further ensnare women in disadvan-
tage and degradation," and that "[fleminists struggle with the di-
lemma of choice, in part, because of an overarching concern about
the paradigm of the 'rational economic man' and the atomistic
1. See Martha M. Ertman, Legal Tenderness: Feminist Perspectives on Contract
Law, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 545, 563 (2006) (book review) (referring to "systemic con-
flicts between classical views of the will-based theory of contract on the one hand and fe-
minist impulses to occasionally protect women from bad deals on the other"); see also Gil-
lian K. Hadfield, The Dilemma of Choice: A Feminist Perspective on The Limits of Freedom
of Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 337, 340 (1995) (noting that in The Limits of Freedom
of Contract Michael Trebilcock argues "that law may continue to endorse the essence of
private ordering as a vindication of autonomy values while at the same time promoting
welfare through regulation of contract terms, distribution policies, and government in-
vestment in human capital, communities, and the means for otherwise private delivery of
social services.).
2. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 1, at 338 ("Autonomy, choice, contract, and, above
all, the market, raise for feminists difficult conflicts between the drive to overcome the his-
torical subjugation that has deprived women of autonomy and choice on the one hand, and
the conviction, on the other, that the institutions of contract law and the market offer pre-
dominantly impoverished and ultimately degrading opportunities for choice by women al-
ready trapped in patriarchy.").
3. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997, 1000 (1985).
4. Id. at 1061 n.244 (quoting Swinton v. Whitinsville Sav. Bank, 42 N.E.2d 808, 808
(Mass. 1942)).
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conception of liberal individualism."5 That may be so, but the
common law is not just about contracts.
In this article I argue that the private side of the ledger, the
common law side, has been chronically under-examined by femin-
ist scholars, particularly as a vehicle for economically empower-
ing and protecting women. I suggest that the laws of agency and
trust, as enhanced by equity and reinforced by the traditional co-
hort of confidential relationships, are fertile ground just waiting
to be cultivated by creative feminist scholars.
The blame for this underutilization of the preexisting legal
landscape I lay squarely at the doorstep of the American law
school, whose core curriculum is now structured almost entirely
around the simplistic and one-dimensional private contract-
versus-state regulation narrative. Most feminist scholars appear
to have bought into this narrative. This, in turn, has engendered
some earnest but unfortunate wheel-inventing. By that I mean
that what is actually being advocated in some quarters is the
tweaking of certain contractual relationships into what are really
fiduciary analogs. But why select an analog when the real thing
is on the shelf within arm's reach, and has been so for hundreds
of years?
To support my thesis that there is a well-trodden quasi-private,
quasi-public middle ground between the law of the jungle and
protective incarceration, between private contract and state regu-
lation, namely the equity-based fiduciary relationships of agency
and trust, I discuss Cleary v. Cleary, a Massachusetts undue in-
fluence agency case involving an elderly woman;6 the phenome-
non of the English marriage settlement, a trust regime which, in
the words of Professor Austin Wakeman Scott, "was a most re-
markable piece of judicial legislation, since it effected a revolution
in the economic position of married women by making it possible
for a married woman to be economically independent of her hus-
band";7 and the Massachusetts trust case of Sullivan v. Burkin, in
which equity intervened to de-fang the revocable inter vivos trust
as a post-mortem vehicle for impoverishing surviving spouses.'
5. Hadfield, supra note 1, at 338.
6. 692 N.E.2d 955 (Mass. 1998).
7. 2 AUSTIN WAKENAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 146.1 (2d ed. 1956).
8. See 460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984).
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The Anglo-American fiduciary relationship, whether structured
as an agency, a trust, or one of their statutory hybrids (e.g., the
corporation), is far more intense and proactive than its civil law
cousins in continental Europe, where equity has never gained a
foothold.9 Commenting on the Anglo-American trust, the great
Cambridge legal scholar Frederick W. Maitland remarked that
"[olf all the exploits of Equity the largest and the most important
is the invention and development of the Trust. It is an 'institute'
of great elasticity and generality; as elastic, as general as con-
tract."' ° In his opinion, the institution of the trust has been Eng-
lish jurisprudence's greatest achievement. "
This article challenges today's feminist scholars to devise crea-
tive ways to deploy the perfectly good weapons that they already
have in their arsenals and which, for some time now, have been
gathering dust: namely, the fiduciary relationships of agency and
trust as enhanced by equity and reinforced by the classic confi-
dential relationships. Wheel re-inventing is wheel spinning.
This article is the third in a series of articles that considers the
implications of the marginalization of the fiduciary relationship
in the American legal academy. In Publicly-Traded Open End
Mutual Funds in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions: A
Comparison of Legal Structures, my colleague and I explained
how the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "Act"), which regu-
lates mutual funds, tweaks the common law of agency and trusts
at the margins, but otherwise leaves it undisturbed. 2 In other
words, the Act would be gibberish without the common law. Se-
curities iawyers take note. In Lawyer Codes Are Just About Li-
censure, the Lawyer's Relationship with the State: Recalling the
Common Law Agency, Contract, Tort, Trust, and Property Prin-
ciples that Regulate the Lawyer-Client Fiduciary Relationship, I
questioned why instruction in the lawyer's Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct is mandatory in most law schools while instruc-
9. See Charles E. Rounds, Jr. & Andreas Dehio, Publicly-Traded Open End Mutual
Funds in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions: A Comparison of Legal Structures, 3
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 473, 517-18 (2007).
10. F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 23 (John Brunyate ed., 2d ed.
1936).
11. FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, The Unincorporate Body, in MAITLAND: SELECTED
ESSAYS 128, 129 (H.D. Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936).
12. Rounds & Dehio, supra note 9, at 475.
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tion in the law of agency is generally not, particularly in light of
the fact that the lawyer-client relationship is one of agency. 3
In this article I endeavor to put the private fiduciary relation-
ship back on the feminists' radar screen. I begin by recovering
some critical common law doctrine, which the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts does little more than incorporate by refer-
ence, almost as an afterthought. 4 Thus, in Part II, I explain the
terms "common law" and "equity" as they are employed in this ar-
ticle. Part III is a brief primer on the core fiduciary relationships
of agency and trust. In Part IV, I invite feminist scholars to ex-
ploit the current judicial confusion over the nature of the confi-
dential relationship-is a trust actually a contract? In Part V, I
explain why the trust is sui generis, why it is not a sub-category
of contract. In Part VI, I discuss academia's marginalization of
the fiduciary relationship. In Part VII, I offer three examples of
how the common law as enhanced by equity has served as a ve-
hicle for empowering and protecting women: the Cleary case, the
marriage settlement phenomenon, and Sullivan v. Burkin. Part
VIII contains a detailed critique of Professor Martha M. Ertman's
Legal Tenderness: Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law and
Professor Clare Dalton's An Essay in the Deconstruction of Con-
tract Doctrine.
II. COMMON LAW AND EQUITY DEFINED
Because the agency and the trust, not to mention equity and
the Anglo-American concept of the fiduciary, are judge-made in-
stitutions, the reader will encounter numerous references to the
common law in this article. The term has meant different things
in different times, including the following: (1) the "law in force in
13. Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Lawyer Codes Are Just About Licensue, the Lawyer's Rela-
tionship with the State: Recalling the Common Law Agency, Contract, Tort, Trust, and
Property Principles that Regulate the Lawyer-Client Fiduciary Relationship 60 BAYLOR L.
REv. 771, 776-78 (2008).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981) ("A person's non-
disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist
.. where the other person is entitled to know the fact because of a relation of trust and
confidence between them."); id. § 169, cmt. c ("In some situations a relationship of trust
and confidence between the parties justifies the reliance of one on the other's opinion.");
id. § 173 ("If a fiduciary makes a contract with his beneficiary relating to matters within
the scope of the fiduciary relation, the contract is voidable by the beneficiary, unless (a) it
is on fair terms, and (b) all parties beneficially interested manifest assent with full under-
standing of their legal rights and of all relevant facts that the fiduciary knows or should
know.").
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all of the Kingdom of England, as distinguished from local custo-
mary law peculiar to a limited area, such as the custom of the
County of Kent" during the medieval period; 15 (2) "judge-made
law-judicial precedents-as distinguished from statutes enacted
by Parliament or some other legislature;" 6 (3) "the law applied by
the former royal courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Ex-
chequer, as distinguished from the canon law applied by the ec-
clesiastical courts and the rules of equity administered by the
High Court of Chancery"; 7 and (4) "the law of those areas which
have systems of private law derived from and more or less resem-
bling the law in force in the Kingdom of England when it merged
in the Kingdom of Great Britain (1 May 1707)."'8 When the term
common law is employed in this article, I employ it in the broad
fourth sense to distinguish the agency and the trust from analog-
ous civil law institutions 9 in continental Europe and elsewhere
that are, for the most part, creatures of all-inclusive codification,2"
such as the German stiftung.2'
This is not to say that the English and the Americans are not
averse to tweaking the common law by statute: "[t]here are ...
both in England and in the United States many statutes that deal
with rules of the law of trusts, but most of them deal with specific
questions, such as what are proper trust investments."22 Even
15. William F. Fratcher, Trust, in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAW ch. 11, at 5 (Frederick H. Lawson, ed. 1973).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 6. Such areas would include the British Isles (except Scotland), the United
States of America (except the State of Louisiana and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico),
Canada (except the Province of Quebec), Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Liberia,
and some of the present and former British colonies and possessions in Africa, the West
Indies and elsewhere. Id.
19. See generally CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR. & CHARLES E. ROUNDS, III, LORING: A
TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK § 8.12.1 (2009) (discussing civil law trust analogs such as the Ger-
man treuhand).
20. See Rounds & Dehio, supra note 9, at 507 (noting that civil law jurisdictions do not
have a generalized body of non-statutory fiduciary law but instead rely on statutes creat-
ing fiduciary-like principles).
21. See generally ROUNDS & ROUNDS, supra note 19 (discussing among others, the
Swiss and German stiftung).
22. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 1.10 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter THE LAW OF TRUSTS]; see, e.g., Allen Trust Co. v. Cowlitz
Bank, 152 P.3d 974, 977 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that Oregon statutes dealing with
trusts "have not supplanted the common law and equitable principles pertaining to trusts
in areas that they do not address"). "In England, there was no general legislation about
trusts until the Trustee Act of 1850, the Trustee Act 1893 saw a consolidation of existing
enactments; and the Trustee Act 1925 was a further general statute." J.D. Heydon, Does
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those fiduciary duties articulated in the federal Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA) are not exhaustive, Con-
gress having deferred to traditional principles of equity to "'define
the general scope of [an ERISA trustee's] authoring and [fidu-
ciary] responsibility.' 23
It has been said that equity is not separate and apart from the
common law as that term is understood in its broadest sense but
is actually a gloss on or collection of appendices to the common
law. For example, one commentator has written, "Equity accepts
the common law ownership of the trustee, but regards it as
against conscience for him to exercise that legal ownership oth-
erwise than for the benefit of the cestui que trust [beneficiary],
and therefore engrafts the equitable obligation upon him."24
Therefore, abuses of the legal agency relationship, as well as
breaches of trust, are subject to equitable remedies.
Besides adding to Anglo-American jurisprudence the institu-
tion of the trust, equity has also added two novel and fertile re-
medies of specific performance and injunction.25 Ultimately, how-
ever, equity will do whatever it takes to make an injured party
whole, including the assessment of damages. Whereas a judgment
at law declared a plaintiffs rights, a decree in equity imposed du-
ties on a defendant; in other words, equity acted and still acts in
personam.26
Equity also has provided a number of detached doctrines-the
so-called equity maxims-which, though critically relevant in the
real world, were decades ago tossed out of the Ivory Tower. 27 I
suggest that there are valuable nuggets hidden among these dis-
carded doctrines just waiting to be found and exploited by the
creative feminist scholar. But I leave that subject for another day.
Statutory Reform Stultify Trusts Law Analysis?, 6 TR. Q. REV., at 11, 27 (2008).
23. Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1299 (3d Cir.
1993) (quoting Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S.
559, 570 (1985)).
24. G. W. KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 95 (6th ed. 1965).
25. MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 22. But see George L. Gretton, Trusts Without Equity,
49 INTERL & COMP. L.Q. 599, 618 (2000) ("It is important that lawyers in the civil law tra-
dition understand that the trust is not a 'unique institution' and has no necessary connec-
tion with equity.").
26. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 1.1, at 5 (5th
ed. 2006) [hereinafter SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS].
27. ROUNDS & ROUNDS, supra note 19, § 8.12 (cataloging some critical equity maxims,
as well as highlighting some of their twenty-first century applications).
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The judicial supervision of the administration of decedents' es-
tates is another of equity's contributions, a topic well beyond the
scope of this article.
Rights, duties, and obligations that are equitable in nature
have their origins in the principles, standards, and rules devel-
oped by courts of chancery.28 Thus, to truly understand equity,
one needs to have some understanding of what these courts are
and how they came to be. The equity saga actually began in thir-
teenth century England. It is a saga whose themes nonetheless
should resonate with twenty-first century feminists:
[Iln the rough days of the thirteenth century, a plaintiff was often
unable to obtain a remedy in the common law courts, even when
they should have had one for him, owing to the strength of the de-
fendant, who would defy the court or intimidate the jury. Either de-
ficiency of remedy or failure to administer it was a ground for peti-
tion to the King in Council to exercise his extraordinary judicial
powers. A custom developed of referring certain classes of these peti-
tions to the Chancellor, and this custom was confirmed by an order
of Edward III in 1349. The Chancellor acted at first in the name of
the King in Council, but in 1474 a decree was made on his own au-
thority, and this practice continued, so that there came to be a Court
of Chancery as an institution independent of the King and his Coun-
cil.2 9
The Lord Chancellor, usually a clergyman, was the officer re-
sponsible for keeping the Great Seal of England, and was a close
adviser of the monarch. 30 Only in 1362, well after the Norman in-
vasion, did the Lord Chancellor, who to this day outranks the
Prime Minister in official precedence, begin addressing Parlia-
ment in English rather than in French.31 The chancery scribes
were responsible for the monarch's paperwork. 32 It is said that
"[t]he genealogy of modern Standard English goes back to Chan-
cery, not Chaucer."33 As keeper of the King's (or Queen's) Con-
science, the Lord Chancellor was once the chief judge of the Court
28. See SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 26, § 1.1, at 5; THE LAW OF TRUSTS,
supra note 22, § 1.
29. SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 8 (P.V. Baker & P. St. J. Langan eds., 28th ed.
1982).
30. The Chancellor was a member of the monarch's private or "privy" council.
31. See ROUNDS & ROUNDS, supra note 19, § 8.15 (discussing in part the phenomenon
of "law French").
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of Chancery.34 In England in 1873, the High Court of Chancery
was merged with the common law courts, the common law judges
then being given the power to administer equity.35
Now to this side of the Atlantic. After the American Revolution,
the "thirteen original states adopted substantially the entire
common law of England. " 36 This included, with little change, Eng-
land's system of equity jurisprudence of which the institution of
the trust was an integral part.31 Massachusetts was the last hold-
out, not fully recognizing equity as a complementary part of its
judicial system until 1877.38 Thus, for sometime in parts of the
United States, trusts were being enforced under contract prin-
ciples in legal proceedings: "It is true that such actions [for breach
of contract by beneficiaries against trustees] were once maintain-
able in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, but that was because
there was originally no equity jurisdiction in those states."39
In most states, with the notable exception of Delaware, there
are no longer separate courts of law and equity.4" The consolida-
tion, however, left intact the substantive differences between le-
gal property interests and equitable property interests.4 The con-
solidation also left intact the substantive differences between
legal duties and equitable duties: "[a]n equitable duty is a duty
enforceable in a court of chancery or in a court having the powers
of a court of chancery."42 The duties of an agent with discretion or
of a trustee are equitable.
It is suggested that intruding too much into equity's domain by
statute and regulation can actually do more harm than good. Fe-
34. 1 STEWART RAPAUiE & ROBERT L. LAWRENCE, A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN AND
ENGLISH LAW 193 (1888).
35. See id. at 194.
36. 1 GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 6 (2d ed. 1951).
37. Id.
38. Edwin H. Woodruff, Chancery in Massachusetts, 5 L.Q. REV. 370, 383-84 (1889);
see SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 26, § 1.9, at 24.
39. SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 26, § 24.12.
40. See Joseph M. Gianola, Jr., Changing Jurisdiction in Chancery Court, 25 MISS. C.
L. REV. 109, 116 (2005) ("As of 1995, only four states still had separate courts of equity:
Mississippi, Arkansas, Delaware, and Tennessee. However, in 2001, Arkansas passed
Amendment 80 to its constitution, which eliminated chancery courts throughout the state.
Arkansas completely merged the two court systems .... .") (footnotes omitted).
41. A share of stock in a corporation would be a legal property interest. A share or
participation in a trusteed mutual fund, e.g., a fund sponsored by Fidelity, Vanguard, or
Bank of America, would be an equitable property interest.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. e (1959).
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minist scholars concerned with empowering and protecting wom-
en economically should particularly take note. J.D. Heydon, the
Australian jurist, explains why:
A primary goal of judicial development of the law is to achieve
coherence, but to combine that goal with vitality. A system of judge-
made law resting on principles of stare decisis has a degree of stabili-
ty; but it teems with life, and is inherently capable of change in the
light of experience. Doubtful problems can often be solved by apply-
ing principles operative generally in the law. The process revivifies
the general principles: it enables them to be explored, understood
afresh when looked at from the new angle, modified in the light of
the new problem so that the general principles in turn can have
slightly different applications in the future.
If the legislature adopts ad hoc solutions for particular problems
(however well intentioned the reform and however convenient its re-
sults in the specific area may be), it tends to deaden and stultify the
process described above, at least for a time. A question remains
whether legislation can maintain that effect in the longer run. The
silent waters of equity run deep-often too deep for legislation to ob-
struct.
43
III. MORE ABOUT THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS
OF AGENCY AND TRUST
"Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a
'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent') that the
agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to
act. 4
"A trust ... is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, aris-
ing from a manifestation of intention to create that relationship and
subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal
with it for the benefit of charity or or one or more persons, at least
one of whom is not the sole trustee.
"J
As I have said, a fiduciary relationship is grounded in either an
agency of the discretionary variety, a trust relationship, or one of
their statutory analogs, e.g., the corporation. 4' The corporation is
43. Heydon, supra note 22, at 27-28.
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003).
46. See id. § 78 cmt. a.; J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Rela-
tionships, 97 L.Q. REV. 51, 51 (1981); see also D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource
Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402-03 (2002) (suggesting that the al-
location of discretion to a person who acts on behalf of another with respect to critical re-
sources belonging to the other should determine whether a particular relationship should
be treated as a fiduciary relationship).
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essentially an agency-trust statutory hybrid. While the directors
are technically not agents of the stockholders,47 and the corpora-
tion itself is not technically a trustee of corporate assets," the di-
rectors have a collective duty of loyalty that is very agency-like
and trustee-like.
A fiduciary has a duty imposed by law to act solely for the ben-
efit of another as to matters within the scope of the relation.49
Parties to an insurance contract are not generally in a fiduciary
relationship. 0 Nor are the parties to a bank account, which is al-
so a contract.51 Absent special facts, a bank that makes a com-
mercial loan to a customer is not generally in a fiduciary relation-
ship with that customer.5 2 If, however, the bank were the
customer's investment manager/agent, then the bank would be in
such a relationship with the customer.5 3 In the former case, the
bank, as lender, would have legal contractual rights to assert
against the customer. In the latter, the customer, as principal,
would have equitable rights that could be asserted against the
bank.
A fiduciary is generally saddled with a duty of prudence,
though one need not be a fiduciary to owe someone such a duty.54
By way of example, a pilot for a major airline though not in a con-
tractual or fiduciary relationship with the passengers in the ca-
bin, nonetheless owes them a duty of prudence that may well be
more rigorous than that of a trustee."
A fiduciary relationship in and of itself is not a contractual re-
lationship, 6 although one may be incident to the other.7 For ex-
ample, there is likely to be a compensation contract, incident to a
47. See ROUNDS & ROUNDS, supra note 19, § 9.9.8.
48. Id. § 9.9.7.
49. SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 26, § 2.1.5.; THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra
note 22, § 2.5.
50. ROUNDS & ROUNDS, supra note 19, § 9.9.1.
51. Id. § 9.9.4.
52. See id.
53. See THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 22, § 8 (noting, however, that "[alithough an
agent is in a fiduciary relationship to his principal, as a trustee is to the beneficiaries of
the trust, the two relationships have a different history and different consequences flow
from them").
54. See Rounds, supra note 13, at 800.
55. Id. at 800-81.
56. See Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L.
REV. 303, 305 (1999).
57. See Rounds, supra note 13, at 803-04.
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lawyer-client, agent-fiduciary relationship," while there is likely
to be an agency-fiduciary relationship incident to a contract be-
tween a broker and his or her customer, provided the broker is
vested with discretionary investment authority.59 Investment
managers and attorneys-at-law are generally fiduciaries.6 An
agent acting under a durable power of attorney (an attorney-in-
fact) is a fiduciary as a matter of law.6 "The duty of loyalty is, for
trustees, particularly strict even by comparison to the standards
of other fiduciary relationships."62
A bailment, though sometimes confused with a trust,63 is not a
trust.6 4 While a trustee generally takes the legal title to the sub-
ject property, a bailee generally does not.65 Thus, a bailee may not
transfer the property in his possession to a bona fide purchaser
("BFP") for value.66 A trustee, on the other hand, can pass good
title to a BFP.67 A trust is an equitable interest, while a bailment
is a legal one. 6' There are differences related to procedure as well:
58. Id. at 778.
59. See Patsos v. First Albany Corp., 741 N.E.2d 841, 849 (Mass. 2001) ("In determin-
ing the scope of the broker's fiduciary obligations, courts typically look to the degree of dis-
cretion a customer entrusts to his broker."); Smith, supra note 46, at 1402 (suggesting that
the allocation of discretion to a person who acts on behalf of another with respect to criti-
cal resources belonging to the other should determine whether a particular relationship
should be treated as a fiduciary relationship).
60. Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D.
Mich. 1978) ("Unlike the broker who handles a nondiscretionary account, the broker han-
dling a discretionary account becomes the fiduciary of his customer in a broad sense.");
Patsos, 741 N.E.2d at 849 (noting that in determining the scope of the broker's fiduciary
obligations, courts typically look to the degree of discretion a customer entrusts to his bro-
ker); 12 C.F.R. § 9.2(e) (2008) (deeming a bank that possesses investment discretion on
behalf of another to be a fiduciary); see Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 304-05 (1998) (suggesting that even a broad grant of discretion by
the client to the lawyer does not negate the client's right under common law agency prin-
ciples to be kept informed and to control the lawyer's fiduciary activities).
61. Archbold v. Reifenrath, 744 N.W.2d 701, 706 (Neb. 2008) (citing First Colony Life
Ins. Co. v. Gerdes, 676 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Neb. 2004)); Vogt v. Warnock, 107 S.W.3d 778, 782
(Tex. 2003) (citing Plummer v. Estate of Plummer, 51 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. App. 2001)).
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. a (2007).
63. See Doyle v. Burns, 99 N.W. 195, 198 (Iowa 1904) (musing that the likes of Justic-
es Story and Kent have failed to sort out the differences between a trust and bailment (cit-
ing 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 559 (D.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., Little,
Brown, and Company 1896) (1826)); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
BAILMENTS § 2, at 2 (Little, Brown, & Company 1878) (1832)).
64. THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 22, § 5.
65. Id.
66. SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 26, § 2.3.1.
67. Id. For a comparison of the BFP, a creature of equity, with the holder in due
course, a creature of law, see ROUNDS & ROUNDS, supra note 19, § 8.15.68.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 5 cmt. e (1959).
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the remedies against a recalcitrant bailee are generally legal, un-
less the subject property is unique," while those against a recalci-
trant trustee are generally equitable. ° Unless the bailment is
coupled with an agency or trust, it is not a fiduciary relation-
ship.71 "Although a few cases outside of the United States treat
bailments as fiduciary relationships, that characterization has
not been adopted by U.S. Courts."72
The priest-penitent, doctor-patient, professor-student, and par-
ent-child relationships, in and of themselves, are confidential re-
lationships, not fiduciary relationships.73 "A confidential relation
exists between two persons when one has gained the confidence of
the other and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in
mind."74 A key difference between the two relationships is the re-
liance requirement. 7' For a confidential relationship to arise,
there must be reliance on the part of the one reposing the confi-
dence.76 A fiduciary relationship, on the other hand, brings with it
a duty of undivided loyalty, whether or not there has been re-
liance.77 Accordingly, a beneficiary in an action against a trustee
for breach of fiduciary duty, absent special facts, need not plead
reliance. Although the trustee-beneficiary relationship is a fidu-
ciary relationship, it can also be one of confidence, depending
upon the facts and circumstances. 8
Regrettably, some courts have been employing the term "in-
formal fiduciary" relationship as a synonym for "confidential rela-
69. THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 22.
70. ROUNDS & ROUNDS, supra note 19, § 7.2.3 (discussing the types of equitable relief
that are available to a trust beneficiary who has been economically harmed by the trus-
tee's breach of trust).
71. Smith, supra note 46, at 1451 n.211.
72. Id.
73. THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 22, § 2.5.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959).
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3
cmt. g (2003).
76. Id.
77. Id.; see Sarah Worthington, Fiduciaries: When Is Self-Denial Obligatory?, 58
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 500, 503 (1999) ("In short, fiduciary terminology should be used carefully
and restrictively, so that fiduciary law operates only to exact loyalty; it does not concern
itself with matters of contract, tort, unjust enrichment and other equitable obligations
(such as breach of confidence).").
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. g
(2003); ROUNDS & ROUNDS, supra note 19, § 6.1.3.5 (discussing the practical implications
of a trustee being in a confidential relationship with a beneficiary).
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tionship." 9 Other courts in recent years, whether out of ignorance
of basic common law doctrine, because of sloppy opinion writing,
or for some other reason, are further muddying the waters when
it comes to sorting out the differences between the two relation-
ships. One court, for example, in a 2006 sexual abuse case,
deemed a classic relationship of confidence, the relationship of a
male guidance counselor with his reliant female ward, to be a fi-
duciary relationship, the court citing to Scott on Trusts, among
other authorities."0 One thing is for sure: absent very special
facts, an abusive sexual relationship is unlikely to implicate the
law of trusts because a trust is a fiduciary relationship with re-
spect to property. The law of agency is perhaps implicated, but
not the law of trusts.
IV. INVITING FEMINIST SCHOLARS To EXPLOIT CURRENT JUDICIAL
CONFUSION OVER THE NATURE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL
RELATIONSHIP
As noted above, the fiduciary principle has become an unruly
horse that has broken out of its corral. Fiduciary relationships in
the Anglo-American legal tradition were essentially limited to
discretionary agency and trust, both being equity-based, or to one
of their statutory hybrids (e.g., the corporation, the guardianship,
or the durable power of attorney). 8'
Conversely, the doctor-patient contractual relationship, absent
special facts, was a confidential relationship, not a fiduciary rela-
tionship. 2 Similarly, the gratuitous priest-penitent relationship
was confidential, not fiduciary. 3 Finally, the teacher-student re-
lationship was no legal relationship at all except one of confidence
in certain circumstances.' 4 The teacher was in an agency rela-
tionship with the school, which was in a contractual relationship
with the student.
79. See Smith, supra note 46, at 1412-13.
80. See Doe v. Harbor Sch., Inc., 843 N.E.2d 1058, 1060, 1064 (Mass. 2006).
81. See THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 22, § 2.5.
82. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
8.3 cmt. g (2003).
83. THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 22, § 2.5.
84. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. g (2003); THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 22, § 2.5.
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Though those of us who practice in the fiduciary area may find
it inconvenient and inefficient that the boundaries between fidu-
ciary and confidential relationships have begun to blur, this blur-
ring should be welcome news to creative feminist scholars and
lawyers. The possibilities are endless when it comes to enlisting
equity in the cause of empowering and protecting women. For ex-
ample, should courts broaden the definition of a fiduciary to en-
compass a commercial lender who intends to extract a loan guar-
antee from the wife of a borrower or declare a husband to be in a
per se fiduciary relationship with his wife, equity could work its
magic: evidentiary burdens would shift, 5 the duty of undivided
loyalty would be implicated, the standard of informed consent
would become a subjective one, 6 and a smorgasbord of flexible
equitable remedies would become available."
While the clever lawyer can shepherd his or her client through
almost any statutory or regulatory minefield, it is quite another
matter to negotiate one of equity's minefields with equity looking
to the intent of the parties to a transaction rather than the atten-
dant formalities.8 8 Equity's body of meta-principles has infused
Anglo-American jurisprudence with a certain humane and flexi-
ble determinacy that critical legal scholars have yet to address
head on.89 This presents a human and flexible determinacy that,
upon systematic reflection, the feminist critical scholar at least
should find liberating and empowering. In any case, a judicial or
legislative tweaking of the definition of a fiduciary or of what
qualifies as a confidential relationship would be an evolutionary
rather than a revolutionary event and thus more likely to gain
acceptance outside the Ivory Tower.
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3
cmt. f (2003).
86. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 173 (1981).
87. See ROUNDS & ROUNDS, supra note 19, § 7.2.3 (discussing types of equitable relief
available for victims of breaches of fiduciary duty in the trust context); Rounds, supra note
13, at 796-97 (discussing types of equitable relief available for victims of breaches of fidu-
ciary duty in the agency context).
88. See SNELL'S EQUITY 5-24 (John McGhee et al. eds., 31st ed. 2005).
89. See generally Kenneth Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 283-84
(1989) (arguing moderate indeterminacy has at most modest consequences for political
legitimacy and kindred concepts).
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V. THE CONTRACTARIANS AND THE ANTI-CONTRACTARIANS:
IS THE TRUST SuI GENERIS?
It is a classic trust principle that, "[alithough the trustee by ac-
cepting the office of trustee subjects himself to the duties of ad-
ministration, his duties are not contractual in nature."9" Still, the
academic community is revisiting the question of whether the
trust is a branch of contract law or a branch of property law.9'
This debate-essentially a continuation of what was begun by
Frederick W. Maitland, who argued the former, and Austin W.
Scott, who argued the latter-presupposes only two private fun-
damental legal relationships: contract and property.9 2 Note, how-
ever, that while Professor Maitland may have come down on the
side of contract, he did so with some ambivalence:
For my own part if a foreign friend asked me to tell him in one word
whether the right of the English Destinatar (the person for whom
property is held in trust) is dinglich[a property interest] or obligato-
risch[a personal claim], I should be inclined to say: "No, I cannot do
that. If I said dinglich, that would be untrue. If I said obligatorisch, I
should suggest what is false. In ultimate analysis the right may be
obligatorisch; but for many practical purposes of great importance it
has been treated as though it were dinglich, and indeed people habi-
tually speak and think of it as a kind of Eigenthum[property] .9
The issue as framed, however, can never be resolved because
the premise, I suggest, is false. In addition to the civil duties of
care to the world at large incident to the law of torts, our legal
system does not have just two private facets, contract and proper-
ty.94 It has four, notwithstanding what the scholars may say:
agency, contract, legal property rights, and trust. There is a total
of five sources of duties because five are needed. No one is suffi-
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 169 cmt. c (1959).
91. See Gretton, supra note 25, at 600-01.
92. For a recent articulation of the contract argument, see SCOTT AND ASCHER ON
TRUSTS, supra note 26, § 13.1 (coming down on the side of those who argue that a trust
beneficiary has a proprietary interest in the underlying trust property, not just a chose in
action or claim against the trustee, but acknowledging that "the scholarly debate contin-
ues"); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,
627 (1995). For a recent articulation of the property argument, see Henry Hansmann &
Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal Economic Analysis, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 437-40 (1998).
93. Frederick William Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in MAITLAND: SELECTED
ESSAYS, supra note 11, at 141, 146.
94. There are also non-consensual legal duties which, when breached, can constitute
torts.
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ciently elastic to encompass another without turning into the oth-
er. Attempting, for example, to squeeze a trust into the third-
party beneficiary contract slot inevitably leaves too much out-
examples include the charitable trust and the private discretio-
nary trust that calls for the shifting of property interests between
and among generations of persons who at the time the contract is
struck are unborn and unascertained. To doctor a third-party be-
neficiary contract into something that would be a satisfactory
substitute for such high maintenance arrangements would mere-
ly transmogrify it into a trust. While a trust has attributes of a
contract, of property, of agency, and even of a corporation, it is
now sui generis, regardless of its evolutionary origins. As one
learned commentator versed in the taxonomies of both the com-
mon law and the civil law has noted, "Trusts do, indeed, impinge
deeply upon both the law of obligations and the law of property,
but they do not belong essentially to either."95 All three, however,
are facets of the single gem we loosely refer to as the common
law.
96
The five facets are profoundly different, yet all are profoundly
interrelated. The trust exhibits agency, property, contractual, and
even corporate attributes, but is sui generis.97 Contractual rights
are themselves property rights. Contractual rights may be the
subject of a trust.9" The equitable interest in one trust may con-
stitute the property of another.99 An agency may be gratuitous or
associated with contractual obligations.'00 The stock in a corpora-
tion, which is internally a statutory tangle of agencies, is a legal
property interest.'0 ' And when a corporation serves as a wrapper
for a mutual fund, it, in equity, is actually a trust."2 Certain
breaches of trust are, for all intents and purposes, torts.'0 3 In the
agency context, a lawyer who commits an act of malpractice
95. Gretton, supra note 25, at 614.
96. For purposes of this section, the term "common law" encompasses the law of equi-
ty.
97. See Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (confirming
that a trust is not a contract); Rounds & Dehio, supra note 9, at 476 (stating that the trust
relationship is sui generis).
98. See, e.g., ROUNDS & ROUNDS, supra note 19, § 9.8.7.
99. 2 THE LAw OF TRUSTS supra note 22, § 83; see SCOTI AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, su-
pra note 26, § 10.4.
100. See Rounds, supra note 13, at 785.
101. A share of corporate stock is an item of intangible personal property.
102. See Rounds & Dehio, supra note 9, at 502.
103. See Smith, supra note 46, at 1453-54.
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against his or her client is committing a tort but not necessarily a
breach of fiduciary duty. 10 4 1 could go on and on.
VI. ACADEMIA'S MARGINALIZATION OF THE
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
Agency, contract, duties of care incident to the law of torts, le-
gal property interests, and trust are facets of the same gem. Each
offers a perspective of the Anglo-American common law. Togeth-
er, they make up the law's periodic table. Statutes either fill gaps
in the common law (for example, the will and the corporation),
modify the common law (for example, the durable power of attor-
ney), or embellish the common law (for example, the tax-qualified
employee benefit plan). Even the federal Investment Company
Act of 1940, which regulates mutual funds, is perched on an edi-
fice of state common law.'05
Civil law jurisdictions such as France and Germany have not
developed trust regimes, or at least regimes that are nearly as
"protean" as the common law trust.10 This occasioned Professor
Maitland to muse on how an English lawyer would likely react
upon first encountering the Civil Code of Germany:
"This," he would say, "seems a very admirable piece of work, worthy
in every way of the high reputation of German jurists. But surely it
is not a complete statement of German private law. Surely there is a
large gap in it. I have looked for the Trust, but I cannot find it; and
to omit the Trust is, I should have thought, almost as bad as to omit
Contract."
10 7
Although fiduciary concepts are marbled throughout the com-
mon law, the elite law schools in the early 1960s began moving
the traditional discrete agency and trusts courses from the re-
quired side of their curriculums to the elective side; since then,
104. Rounds, supra note 13, at 801.
105. See Rounds & Dehio, supra note 9, at 502-03.
106. See ROUNDS & ROUNDS, supra note 19, § 8.12.1; Gretton, supra note 25, at 599
("[Tihe slogan of modern comparative law-compare function rather than form'--does not
work for the trust. One cannot identify the function of the trust because there is no such
function. The trust is functionally protean. Trusts are quasi-entails, quasi-usufructs, qua-
si-wills, quasi-corporations, quasi-securities over assets, schemes for collective investment,
vehicles for the administration of bankruptcy, vehicles for bond issues, and so on and so
forth. In software terminology, trusts are emulators.") (footnotes omitted); Rounds & De-
hio, supra note 9, at 507-10.
107. Maitland, supra note 93, at 142-43.
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most of the other ABA-approved law schools have followed suit. °8
This process of marginalizing the core fiduciary relationships in
the American law school is now all but complete, notwithstanding
the fact that "our society is evolving into one based predominant-
ly on fiduciary relations."1"9 That the core business of a law school
is to turn out agent-fiduciaries has carried little weight:
In 1908 when the American Bar Association adopted the original
Canons of Professional Ethics, instruction in the core equity-based
relationships of agency and trust, as well as the core law-based rela-
tionships of contract, tort, and property, was mandatory in most, if
not all, the law schools. It most certainly never occurred to those who
had been encouraging the bench and bar to endorse and adopt a law-
yer code that by the end of the century instruction in the two private
fiduciary relationships would no longer be required in most Ameri-
can law schools. Back then, lawyer codes presumed a bench and bar
that were thoroughly grounded in the common law, as the focus of
such codifications was merely on licensure, the lawyer's relationship
with the state. That is still the focus. There has been no appreciable
expansion in the scope and coverage of the Canons of Professional
Ethics, or its successor codifications. On the other hand, we have
seen a considerable pedagogical undermining over time of the com-
mon law foundations upon which those regulatory edifices were con-
structed.110
VII. THREE EXAMPLES OF HOW THE COMMON LAW AS ENHANCED
BY EQUITY HAS SERVED AS A VEHICLE FOR EMPOWERING AND
PROTECTING WOMEN
A. Cleary v. Cleary
Cleary v. Cleary, a 1998 Massachusetts case, involved an agent
who received collateral economic benefits incident to the agency,
possibly in breach of his fiduciary duty to the principal-his el-
derly aunt.1 The issue was an evidentiary one: whether the bur-
den was on the agent fiduciary to prove that the self-dealing
108. See Rounds, supra note 13, at 777 n.19; see also E. GORDON GEE & DONALD W.
JACKSON, FOLLOWING THE LEADER? THE UNEXAMINED CONSENSUS IN LAW SCHOOL
CURRICULA 6, 14-15, 22-25, 47-48 (1975) (examining the "follow the leader" behavior of
law school faculties and comparing core law school curricula in the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s); WILLIAM B. POWERS, A.B.A., A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA
12 (1986) (providing a catalog of courses that were typically required in law schools
in the 1970s, which does not include discrete courses in the agency and the trust).
109. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 798 (1983).
110. Rounds, supra note 13, at 776 n.12.
111. 692 N.E.2d 955, 956 (Mass. 1998).
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transaction was free of fraud, duress, and undue influence and
that the principal had given her subjective informed consent to
the self-dealing. 112 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that the burden of proof was on the agent fiduciary.113 That
being the case, I wonder whether it is really worth the time and
effort of feminist scholars to deconstruct certain contractual rela-
tionships and then rearrange the pieces into quasi-fiduciary rela-
tionships, particularly if it is in fact the case that most abusive
financial relationships will have a common law agency component
to them. I will take up the matter of deconstructing and re-
arranging the elements of the classic contractual relationship lat-
er. The laws of agency, enforced in equity since time immemorial,
have been more than adequate to make whole those principals
who have been financially abused by their agents.114 A critical ex-
amination from the feminist perspective of the intersection, or
lack thereof, of the laws of contract and agency would be well
worth the effort.
Human nature being what it is, the typical marriage or cohabi-
tation is marbled with agency relationships, some formal and
some informal. The durable power of attorney is an example of a
formal agency. Handling the household finances by default is an
example of an informal agency. In each case, the agent is a fidu-
ciary with a duty to act solely in the interest of the principal. In
Cleary, the self-dealing nephew was both his aunt's agent under a
formal durable power of attorney and the handler of her fin-
ances." 5 Either agency standing alone would have been sufficient
to shift the burden of proof to him as to the fairness of the self-
dealing transaction.1,6
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, a husband is not a
common law agent of his wife, and never has been. The husband
abusively procures from his wife, either by gift or incident to a
contract, $1 million dollars of her own funds. In this situation, is
there really any need to create any new paradigms? The confiden-
tial relationship is a pre-existing legal/equitable relationship that
112. Id. at 958.
113. Id. at 960 ("Once a fiduciary relationship is established, however, the fiduciary
who benefits in that relationship must show that he has fulfilled his duty.").
114. Rounds, supra note 13, at 796-97 (discussing the remedies available to a principal
in equity).
115. Cleary, 692 N.E.2d at 956-57.
116. See id. at 960.
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is somewhat more amorphous than the classic agency, to be sure,
but still a relationship that is not without a full set of teeth.
A husband and wife would be in a confidential relationship if
the husband had gained the confidence of the wife in financial
matters, provided there is reliance on the part of the wife. The
Restatement of Property then would create a presumption of un-
due influence, the effect of which would be "to shift to the propo-
nent," in this case the husband, "the burden of going forward with
the evidence, but not the burden of persuasion" as to the fairness
of the self-dealing transaction.117 In Massachusetts, the "burden
of proof' as to fairness would appear to shift only if the husband
were also the wife's agent-fiduciary.118 In any case, I am merely
calling this unsettled corner of the common law to the attention of
feminist scholars. Opportunity often lurks in legal confusion.
Even in the absence of reliance, there is always common law
fraud, duress, or undue influence, though the initial burden of
proof would be on the wife. Again, most of these wheels were in-
vented long ago. It seems one would be hard-pressed to come up
with a real-world scenario involving spousal financial abuse that
the common law, as enhanced by equity, would not be fully
equipped to remedy cost-effectively and efficiently. My hope is
that this article prompts a feminist reaction to this assertion,
whether favorable or unfavorable, that squarely addresses the
core common law doctrine that is threaded throughout this ar-
ticle.
Finally, it has long been settled that a third party who kno-
wingly participates with an agent in a breach of the agent's fidu-
ciary duty-a bank or an insurance agency, for example-shares
liability with the agent for any damage done to the principal's
economic interests."9 At some point I hope to see a full fleshing
out of whether, from the feminist perspective, an innocent partic-
ipating third party should be made a constructive insurer of the
fairness of a self-dealing transaction between an agent and his
principal, such as in a case where a wife guarantees her hus-
band's bank loan.
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. f
(2003).
118. See Cleary, 692 N.E.2d at 959.
119. See Rounds, supra note 13, at 788.
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B. The Marriage Settlement
As late as 1935, it was common law in this country that a mar-
ried woman had no capacity to hold legal title to chattels since
they passed to her husband.12 Of course, married women general-
ly had by then been given capacity to hold and deal with property
separate from their husbands by statute.12' On the other hand, in
equity, a married woman had long had the capacity to be the be-
neficiary of a trust of chattels for her separate use even in the ab-
sence of statute. 22 "Although the husband had rights in his wife's
equitable estates similar to those given to him in her legal es-
tates, it was through courts of equity that married women first
obtained some amelioration of the harsh rules of the common
law." 23 A trust of interests in land and choses in action could also
be created for her separate and exclusive use.'24 In other words,
embedded in the common law and enhanced by equity was the
principle that though a feme covert could not own legal property
interests, she could, nonetheless, own equitable property inter-
ests.'25
The law owes this circumventing of the disabilities of coverture
to creative English lawyers and accommodating chancellors. I am
referring to the "marriage settlements" alluded to in the begin-
ning pages of Charles Dickens' Bleak House: "The old gentleman
is rusty to look at, but is reputed to have made good thrift out of
aristocratic marriage settlements and aristocratic wills, and to be
very rich. He is surrounded by a mysterious halo of family confi-
dences; of which he is known to be the silent depositary."'26
From the latter part of the eighteenth century until the enact-
ment of legislation in the nineteenth century providing that a
husband, upon marriage, would no longer automatically acquire
an interest in his wife's property, it was common practice in Eng-
120. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 118 cmt. a (1935).
121. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 312 (6th ed. 2006).
122. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 118 cmt. a (1935).
123. CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 47 (2d
ed. 1988).
124. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 118 cmt. a (1935); MOYNIHAN, supra note 123,
at 47-48.
125. MOYNIHAN, supra note 123, at 47-48. At the instant of marriage, a woman became
a feme covert because she moved under her husband's protection. DUKEMINIER, supra note
121, at 312.
126. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, 9-10 (Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1963) (1853).
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land to create a trust upon marriage. "By the marriage settle-
ment the parents or other relatives of the persons who [were] to
marry, or those persons themselves, transfer[red] property to
trustees in trust for the parties to the marriage and for their
prospective issue."127 If a settlor had so provided, a wife's equita-
ble interest under a marriage settlement had the status of sepa-
rate property. 12 8 According to Professor Scott, "[t]his was a most
remarkable piece of judicial legislation, since it effected a revolu-
tion in the economic position of married women by making it
possible for a married woman to be economically independent of
her husband."129 The key: an equitable interest under a trust is as
much property as the legal property interests that are the subject
of a first-year property course. 3 ° My point is that today's feminist
scholars and lawyers would do well to take a page from the book
of the rusty solicitor who, with minimal fanfare and effort, set
about to make mincemeat of the coverture disability. 13' Equity, in
all its richness and power, is very much out there in the real
world and is available for exploitation by the knowledgeable and
the creative, notwithstanding its banishment from the Ivory
Tower.
Before moving on to Sullivan v. Burkin, I will make one other
point that is technical and, to some extent, pedagogical. There ex-
ists, in some quarters, an earnest effort to carve out a discrete
body of law that is dedicated to the fiduciary principle.3 2 The im-
petus for this effort is, in part, the tendency of modern courts to
blur the fiduciary and confidential relationships, a topic I have
already discussed. 3 ' I suggest that from the feminist perspective
any scholarly stab at bringing conceptual order out of this chaos
127. THE LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 22, § 17.
128. See id. § 146.1.
129. Id. § 17.
130. It is unfortunate that Property casebooks today give short shrift to the equitable
property interest, particularly as equitable ownership plays such a critical role in today's
global financial system. A share of a trusteed mutual fund, for example, is an equitable
property interest. Rounds & Dehio, supra note 9, at 476. One popular Property casebook I
perused devoted only three out of 1,171 pages to the equitable property interest. See
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW 503-05 (4th ed. 2006).
131. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 109, at 798 (stating that a major reason for recogniz-
ing a separate body of fiduciary law is that society is evolving into one based predominant-
ly on fiduciary relations); Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539,
540-41 (1949) (discussing the basic nature of fiduciary law); Smith, supra note 46, at
1400-02 (arguing for a unified theory of fiduciary duties).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
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by forging a unified theory of the fiduciary would be ill-advised if
it entails a conceptual decoupling of the fiduciary from the under-
lying core relationships of agency and trust. The marriage set-
tlement phenomenon illustrates what I mean: yes, the trust is a
fiduciary relationship, but it is also a vehicle for transforming le-
gal property interests into equitable property interests. It was the
property aspects of the trust relationship-namely that legal title
to the subject property is in the trustee but the economic interest
is in the beneficiary-working in tandem with the fiduciary prin-
ciple that enabled the rusty solicitor to subvert the coverture dis-
ability.13 4 The fiduciary principle alone would not have done the
trick. Agency, contracts, trusts, and property are mere facets of
one gem known as the common law. Each should not be looked at
in isolation. Law school curriculum committees should take note.
C. Sullivan v. Burkin
When it comes to enhancing the empowerment and protection
of women, one would be hard-pressed to come up with a more au-
dacious example of judicial legislation than the 1984 Massachu-
setts equity case of Sullivan v. Burkin, which prospectively cir-
cumvented the limitations of a classic post-mortem spousal
election statute. 13' Equity certainly outdid itself in that case. As
the marriage settlement phenomenon was equity's response to
the disabilities of coverture that had been imposed on married
women by the common law, Sullivan v. Burkin was equity's re-
sponse to the legal limitations of the spousal election statute, a
legal regime that had eclipsed the ancient English common law
regime of dower.'36
Thus I begin the analysis of the case with English dower, an
ancient inter vivos legal property right in the nature of an inter
vivos protective cloud on land title.'37 That right was known as
inchoate dower.'38 "No conveyance by the husband, even to a bona
fide purchaser for value, would be effective to defeat the wife's
134. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
135. 460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984).
136. See Kenneth Rampino, Note, Spousal Disinheritance in Rhode Island: Barrett v.
Barrett and the (De)evolution of the Elective Share Law, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
420, 431-32 (2007).
137. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 121, at 335-36.
138. MOYNIHAN, supra note 123, at 50.
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right to dower, nor could creditors of the husband impair her
right."139 Post-mortem, it afforded married women certain protec-
tions: "[t]he law gave dower to a surviving wife in all freehold
land of which her husband was seised during marriage and that
was inheritable by the issue of husband and wife."14° Common law
dower generally prevailed not only in England but also in her co-
lonies, including Massachusetts, at least as early as 1647.141
Immediately after the American Revolution, the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts enacted a gender-neutral spousal elec-
tion statute that allowed the surviving spouse, in lieu of taking by
will, to opt for a partial life estate in all properties, real and per-
sonal, which the deceased spouse had owned at the time of his or
her death.142 Thus, the reach of the statute could be avoided by an
inter vivos transfer of property to a third person, including a trus-
tee.
By 1944, it had become settled law in Massachusetts that one
could create a valid inter vivos trust even though one had re-
served a right to revoke it and take back the subject property free
of trust.4 3 Not only had equity created a will substitute, it had al-
so created a vehicle for circumventing the Massachusetts spousal
election statute. Because the trustee took the legal title, techni-
cally anything in the trust at the settlor's death was not owned by
the settlor and thus was beyond the reach of the statute.
Fast-forwarding to 1984, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Sullivan v. Burkin, for all intents and purposes, equita-
bly rewrote the statute to encompass not only probate property
but also property held in revocable inter vivos trusts.144 "It is nei-
ther equitable nor logical," reasoned the court, "to extend to a di-
vorced spouse greater rights in the assets of an inter vivos trust
created and controlled by the other spouse than are extended to a
spouse who remains married until the death of his or her
139. Id.
140. DUKEMINIER, supra note 121, at 335.
141. See THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE
INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS 17 (Thomas G. Barnes ed., Castle Press 1975)
(1648). See generally Kathleen M. O'Connor, Note, Marital Property Reform in Massachu-
setts: A Choice for the New Millennium, 34 NEw ENG. L. REV. 261, 272-76 (1999) (discuss-
ing the historical common law property concept of dower).
142. The modern version is codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 191, § 15 (LexisNexis
1994). The original law was codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 24, § 8 (1783).
143. See Nat'l Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 53 N.E.2d 113, 123-24 (Mass. 1944).
144. See Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984).
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spouse." What must have been galling to the widowed and im-
poverished plaintiff, however, was that the rewrite was not made
retroactive. 146 The court went on to invite the Massachusetts leg-
islature to bring law and equity into conformance by appropriate-
ly amending the election statute.
147
Now the feminist scholar may say that this is all well and good,
but resorting to equity can only be a stopgap solution in a given
situation. Equity is too ad hoc, too untidy. There is no substitute,
the feminist scholar would argue, for all-inclusive legislation and
state regulation when it comes to empowering and protecting
women. But to this day, the Massachusetts legislature has been
unable to figure out how to amend its spousal election statute to
conform to the spirit of Sullivan. More than twenty-five years
have passed, numerous study committees have convened and dis-
banded, and still the statute remains on the books pretty much in
its original form as enacted in 1783.148 Equity may not be a tidy
creature, but it is quick and agile, and it does have teeth. Post-
modern feminist scholars have yet to scratch the surface of equi-
ty's myriad possibilities.
VIII. REINVENTING THE FIDUCIARY WHEEL IN THE
CAUSE OF FEMINISM
Professor Dalton's Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doc-
trine purports to "give an account of selected portions of contract
doctrine and the themes and problems that permeate them," and
to "demonstrate how our preoccupation with questions of power
and knowledge is mirrored in doctrinal structures that depend on
the dualities of public and private, objective and subjective, form
and substance." 49 She "suggest[s] that it is these problems of
power and knowledge, these doctrinal structures, which contri-
145. Id.
146. Id. at 574.
147. See id. at 578.
148. See generally O'Connor, supra note 141, at 261, 268-71 (analyzing "the options
available to Massachusetts as it responds to the Supreme Judicial Court's call to the legis-
lature, following its decision in Sullivan v. Burkin to reform the elective share statute in
Massachusetts," and describing the subsequent unsuccessful efforts of various interest
groups to get the legislature to actually enact elective share reform legislation (citations
omitted)).
149. Dalton, supra note 3, at 1000.
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bute to the inconsistency and substantial indeterminacy of con-
tract doctrine."150
Well, perhaps. But what about the intersection of equity's fidu-
ciary principle with contract doctrine? After all, the fiduciary
principle is a quasi-public, quasi-private doctrine that elevates
the subjective over the objective and substance over form, a doc-
trine whose very purpose is to address the "power and knowledge"
imbalance that can infect certain human relationships. Where
does that fit into the feminist's scheme of things? Perhaps it does
not, or should not. But Professor Dalton assiduously avoids ven-
turing across equity's fertile plains or through its gradual moun-
tain passes, opting rather to scale the jagged mountains of the
law head on, one after the other. An opportunity was missed to
get the benefit of at least one respected feminist's perspective on
the intersection of fiduciary and contract doctrine. That is not to
say that Professor Dalton does not tiptoe up to the boundaries of
the mysterious land of the fiduciary. But somehow she cannot
bring herself to cross into it. She finds the legal doctrines of im-
plied contract, duress, and unconscionability wanting as instru-
ments for empowering and protecting women. 5' But what else is
new? It has been ever thus. To mitigate such inflexibilities in the
law was why equity was invented centuries ago.
I start with the quasi-contract. "A quasi contractual obligation
is one that is created by the law for reasons of justice, without
any expression of assent and sometimes even against a clear ex-
pression of dissent." '152 Thus, if "A finds B's house afire and his
cattle starving and renders service and incurs expense in saving
and feeding them," B may be "under a quasi contractual duty of
reimbursement.' 15 3 A quasi-contract is an equitable relationship
analog, not a real equitable relationship. By "equitable relation-
ship analog," I mean that "[tihe exact terms of the promise that is
'implied' must frequently be determined by what equity and mo-
rality appear to require after the parties have come into con-
flict." "'54 Thus, it should come as no surprise that a quasi-
contractual relationship that is not also a fiduciary relationship
150. Id.
151. See id. at 1038-39.
152. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 19, at 27 (One Vol. ed. 1952).
153. Id. § 19, at 29.
154. Id. § 19, at 27-28.
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has profound limitations when it comes to the empowerment and
protection of women:
A court can find or not find a "real" contract. It can decide that en-
forcement of a real contract is or is not appropriate. It can decide
that while real contracts should be enforced, there is no basis for
awarding quasi-contractual relief in the absence of an expressed in-
tention to be bound. It can decide that even in the absence of real
contract, the restitutionary claim of the plaintiff represents a com-
pelling basis for quasi-contractual relief. 155
A contract between parties to a fiduciary relationship, however,
must be subjectively and scrupulously fair to the vulnerable par-
ty-the one to whom the fiduciary owes the affirmative duty of
undivided loyalty.15 s It is a facts and circumstances test. The
same generally goes for the parties to a confidential relation-
ship.'57 Furthermore, when it comes to empowering and protect-
ing women, equity's tent is much larger than the law's tent in
that equity's fiduciary principle encompasses donative transfers
as well as express or implied exchanges of consideration.
To be sure, the legal doctrines of duress ' and unconscionabili-
ty 59 in the contract context have an equitable flavor to them in
155. Dalton, supra note 3, at 1100.
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 173 (1981) ("If a fiduciary makes a con-
tract with his beneficiary relating to matters within the scope of the fiduciary relation, the
contract is voidable by the beneficiary, unless (a) it is on fair terms, and (b) all parties be-
neficially interested manifest assent with full understanding of their legal rights and of all
relevant facts that the fiduciary knows or should know."); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. g (2003) (discussing three types of
confidential relationships that give rise to a presumption of undue influence-fiduciary,
reliant, and dominant-subservient relationships).
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981) ("A person's non-
disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist
... (d) where the other person is entitled to know the fact because of a relation of trust and
confidence between them."); id. § 169 cmt. c ("In some situations a relationship of trust
and confidence between the parties justifies the reliance of one or the other's opinion.").
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981) ("If a party's manifestation of
assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no rea-
sonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.").
159. Id. § 208. ("If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract
is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any uncons-
cionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.") The equitable flavor of the uncons-
cionability doctrine comes through loud and clear in comment d to section 208:
But gross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably
favorable to the stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction
involved elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker
party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent
or appear to assent to the unfair terms.
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that they involve questions of power and fairness:
In order to constitute duress, the improper threat must induce the
making of the contract.... The test is subjective and the question is,
did the threat actually induce assent on the part of the person claim-
ing to be the victim of duress. Threats that would suffice to induce
assent by one person may not suffice to induce assent by another. All
attendant circumstances must be considered, including such matters
as the age, background and relationship of the parties. Persons of a
weak or cowardly nature are the very ones that need protection; the
courageous can usually protect themselves. Timid and inexperienced
persons are particularly subject to threats, and it does not lie in the
mouths of the unscrupulous to excuse their imposition on such per-
sons on the ground of their victims' infirmities. 160
In the words of Professor Dalton, the two doctrines "wrestle
with both the difficulty of ascertaining subjective intent, and the
conflict among policy commitments to subjective and objective
value, individualism and altruism.""' Still, she finds that these
doctrines "identify the only recognized deviations from the suppo-
sedly standard case of equal contracting partners."'62 Again, I
respectfully disagree. There is a vast and rich body of law dealing
not only with the exchange of consideration between parties to fi-
duciary or confidential relationships, but also with gifting in the
fiduciary and confidential contexts. Courts of equity have been
wrestling with questions of power and fairness since time imme-
morial. Professor Dalton stops just short of advocating that the
legal doctrines of duress and unconscionability be retrofitted into
fiduciary analogs, being more or less satisfied to just call atten-
tion to contract law's limitations when it comes to facilitating the
empowerment and protection of women.
Professor Ertman, in Legal Tenderness: Feminist Perspectives
on Contract Law, also skirts the vast body of law that deals with
contracts between the parties to a fiduciary or confidential rela-
tionship: All this low-hanging fruit is just waiting to be plucked.
Professor Ertman employs the term "agency," but in a different
sense from the way I employ it in this article. In Legal Tender-
ness, "agency" connotes the freedom to order one's affairs contrac-
tually and otherwise.'63 Yet, as I have already noted, in a common
Id. § 208 cmt. d.
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. c (1981).
161. Dalton, supra note 3, at 1032.
162. Id. at 1107.
163. See Ertman, supra note 1, at 546 (defining capacity to contract, or to freely order
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law agency relationship, which conceptually is on the other side
of the relational scale, the agent is quite constrained as to mat-
ters within the scope of the agency. A common law agent has a
duty to act solely in the interest of the principal-the vulnerable
party, the one who aspires to a state of legal autonomy."6'
Professor Ertman, reviewing Linda Mulcahy and Sally Whee-
ler's book, Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law, 6 ' explores "[t]o
what extent do and should wives, women, and feminine persons
generally receive 'tender' treatment by contract law."'66 In the
process of so doing, however, she appears to ignore a vast amount
of basic common law doctrine, namely that equity's fiduciary
principle long ago sanded down contract law's rough edges in a
number of situations that are of concern to feminists, such as
when there is an imbalance of bargaining power between a man
and a woman, or when one party has a monopoly on access to crit-
ical information. What follows are examples of some of the wheel
re-inventing that I, rightly or wrongly, perceive in the article and
in feminist scholarship generally.
In both Legal Tenderness and Feminist Perspectives, there is
much discussion of the British spousal-guarantee contract cases,
which implicate the so-called "'special tenderness' doctrine toward
married women and other cohabitants in noncommercial guaran-
tee cases."67 In essence, a British bank that seeks a wife's guar-
antee of her husband's contractual obligation to the bank needs to
satisfy itself that the husband is not exercising undue influence
over the wife. 61 Professor Ertman suggests that "[t]he spousal-
guarantee cases are particularly suited for classroom discussion
because classical contract theory cannot quite resolve the issues
they raise.' 69 I disagree. There is a vast body of "classic" contract
law that addresses contracts between parties to a fiduciary or
confidential relationship. The problem is not the law, but legal
one's affairs, as being composed of consent and agency),
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006); see id. §§ 8.02-8.06 (2006) (illu-
strating how the general fiduciary principle would apply in certain situations).
165. FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW (Linda Mulcahy & Sally Wheeler eds.,
2005).
166. Ertman, supra note 1, at 551.
167. See id. at 548; Adam Geary, Women Lie Back Everywhere: The Symbolic Economy
of Restitution, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW, supra note 165, at 91, 97-
105.
168. Ertman, supra note 1, at 548.
169. Id.
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education. In the 1952 one-volume edition of Corbin on Contracts,
there was no coverage whatsoever of such contracts, 7 ° but that
was understandable and excusable. At that time, Agency and
Trusts were discrete required courses in most law schools.' 7 ' This
is no longer the case. 72 And yet, the 2008 edition of one contracts
casebook devotes just two pages (out of 1062) to contracts that are
affected by a relationship of trust or confidence.'73
There is also a vast body of pre-existing common law imposing
liability on a third party who knowingly participates in a breach
of fiduciary duty.'74 Thus, if a bank knows, or should know, that a
husband is exercising undue influence on his wife to guarantee a
loan that the bank intends to make to the husband and the hus-
band is an agent of his wife pursuant to a durable power of attor-
ney, then the bank would be liable in equity for the consequences
of that participation. To be sure, if the husband's equitable rela-
tionship with his wife is merely one of confidence, then under the
current state of the law, the bank's liability is more problematic
because of the subjective reliance requirement. It would seem
that feminist scholars could be getting more mileage for their ef-
forts if they operated within the context of pre-existing law. They
might, for example, explore the feasibility of getting the courts to
impose on commercial lenders equitable liability for innocently
participating in spousal breaches of fiduciary duty or confidence.
Perhaps the spousal relationship should be deemed per se a fidu-
ciary or confidential one, at least in the commercial context.
In any case, I respectfully suggest that feminist scholars first
should be exploiting such pre-existing legal and equitable ambi-
guities, plucking the low-hanging fruit as it were, before injecting
some unwieldy civil law analog into the law of a common law ju-
risdiction by statute, as was done in Wisconsin on January 1,
1986 with the Wisconsin Marital Property Act.'75 The Massachu-
170. See generally CORBIN, supra note 152.
171. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
172. See id.
173. See JAMES F. HOGG ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 627-29 (2008).
174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979) (providing that two or more
people engaged in tortious conduct are each subject to liability for the entire harm);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 326 (1959) (aiding and abetting a trustee in a breach
of fiduciary duty); see also SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 26, § 30.6.5; 4 THE
LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 22, § 326.
175. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.01(5)(c) (West 2001).
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setts legislature may well be waiting to see how the Wisconsin
experiment plays out before embarking on a wholesale codifica-
tion of Sullivan v. Burkin:
What is surprising, however, is that having had the advantage of
years of case law from the other jurisdictions, the [Wisconsin] legis-
lature did not explicitly codify rules governing some major aspects of
community property law. If the legislature chose to have the courts
further define the law, it may now be disappointed by the lack of de-
velopment in some areas. More than two decades later, key areas of
Wisconsin's marital property law remain substantially undeve-
loped.17 6
I challenge feminist scholars to explain the extent to which re-
lational contract theory, which "critiques classical contract law
for its failure to account for the lack of real agreement in con-
tracts where terms appear in pre-printed forms and bargaining
power is sufficiently unbalanced so that only one party has the
power to determine those terms,"177 is not subsumed in the classic
fiduciary principle as reinforced by the classic confidential rela-
tionship or why the concept of "special tenderness" is not, for all
intents and purposes, a fiduciary analog.
In the conclusion to Legal Tenderness, Professor Ertman as-
serts that "[fleminism and contract have more in common than
many people think."17 I would be more emphatic: contract law, as
it has been tamed by the fiduciary principle, may well be a wheel
that needs no reinventing when it comes to the empowerment
and protection of women. Long ago the courts staked out a sensi-
ble middle ground between full autonomy and protective incarce-
ration, somewhere in the vast expanse of the common law. Those
stakes are out there still.
IX. CONCLUSION
The contract is not the only private consensual legal relation-
ship woven into the fabric of the common law. There are also the
agency and the trust, the two robust and powerful core fiduciary
relationships, the former being equity-based and the latter being
176. David R. Knauss, Comment, What Part of Yours Is Mine?: The Creation of a Ma-
rital Property Ownership Interest by Improving Nonmarital Property Under Wisconsin's
Marital Property Law, 2005 WiS. L. REV. 855, 860.
177. Ertman, supra note 1, at 549.
178. Id. at 570.
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an actual creature of equity. Reading Legal Tenderness and De-
construction of Contract Doctrine, I came away with the sense
that the development of the property branch of feminist scholar-
ship is being stifled by the false contextual assumption that there
are really only two general ways of empowering and protecting
women economically-the private contract or the state regulation.
In this article I have endeavored to make the case that the pri-
vate side of the ledger, the common law side, has been chronically
under-examined by feminist scholars, particularly as a vehicle for
empowering and protecting women economically. I suggest that
the laws of agency and trust, as enhanced by equity and rein-
forced by the traditional cohort of confidential relationships, are
fertile ground just waiting to be cultivated by creative feminist
scholars.
The blame for this underutilization of the pre-existing legal
landscape I lay squarely at the doorstep of the American law
school, whose core curriculum is now structured around the sim-
plistic and one-dimensional private contract versus state regula-
tion narrative. Most feminist scholars appear to have bought into
this narrative. This, in turn, has engendered some earnest but
unfortunate reinventing of the wheel. By that I mean that what is
actually being advocated in some quarters is the tweaking of cer-
tain contractual relationships into what are really fiduciary ana-
logs. But why select an analog when the real thing is on the shelf
within arm's reach and has been so for hundreds of years?
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